Member Article: Chas Freeman on the Mid East Policy Consequences

The GCC functioned as a coherent alliance during the US-led war to
 liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation that followed the end of the
 Iran-Iraq war. Its members separately provided essential staging areas
and  support bases for the US invasion and occupation of Iraq a dozen
years  later. Some have since deepened their reliance on the United
States, while  others have hedged their previous dependency.

Now the GCC member  states may be facing their greatest challenge: the
changes brought about  by the progressive collapse of American policies
in the region, including  US efforts to transform Iraq, to block Iran's
acquisition of nuclear  weapons, and to achieve security for Israel by
persuading it to respect  the right of Palestinians to democratic
self-determination in a secure  homeland.

The US military have developed the useful concept of  "consequence
management." The idea is to set aside for later study the  questions of
why and how widespread devastation followed the use of  weapons of mass
destruction or a large-scale natural disaster, and instead  to
acknowledge the damage while focusing on actions to mitigate it and
 prevent it from worsening. It is time to apply consequence management
to  the mounting wreckage of our policies in the Middle East.

Only  true believers in the neo-conservative dream can now fail to
recognize  that it has wrought a deepening nightmare in Iraq. The
shattered Iraqi  state has been succeeded (outside Kurdish areas) by
near-universal  resistance to the foreign occupation that supplanted it.
The aggravation  of secular and ethnic divisions by ill-conceived
constitutional bargaining  and elections has created a new political
culture in Iraq in which  theocratic feudalism, militia-building, and
terrorist violence are the  principal modes of self-expression.

The attempt to cure the  resulting anarchy by building a strong army and
police force for the Iraqi  central government misses the point. The
Baghdad government is itself a  key participant in all of the
pathologies of contemporary Iraq. In  practice, it is more a vengeful
tyranny of the majority in a temporary  marriage of convenience with
Kurdish separatists than a government of all  the people. It is hard to
disprove the thesis that it seeks a monopoly on  the use of force only
to consolidate either a Shiite version of Saddam's  dictatorship or an
Iraqi version of the Iranian theocracy. The sad fact is  that, to many
Iraqis, these outcomes now seem to offer the most realistic  hope for
renewed domestic tranquility in their country.

All but a  small minority of Iraqi Arabs now reject the legitimacy of
any continuing  US military presence on Iraqi soil. On the one hand, the
occupation has  become the indispensable prop of the current order in
Iraq, such as it is;  on the other, the prolongation of the occupation
is the main reason Iraqis  wage an insurgent war against that order. The
occupation thus supplies its  own opposition; its continuation feeds the
violence that makes its  eventual curtailment inevitable.

The unpopularity of the  occupation continues to provide a rewarding
opening for outside agitators.  Al Qa`ida now openly acknowledges a
major stake in the US staying in Iraq  for as long as possible. Our
military presence is not just a potent  motivator of anti-Americanism
and a source of volunteers for terrorism, it  has put us in the position
of providing instructors to "Jihad U," the  graduate school we have
inadvertently created in Iraq for terrorists with  global reach - an
advanced curriculum, where failure is punished by death  at our hands,
but course completion is rewarded by a chance to take part  in future
terrorist operations in Europe, Asia, and North America. The  costs of
the occupation must be measured in much more than the hundreds of
 billions of dollars we continue to spend on it.

No one can predict  how US forces will withdraw from Iraq, but no one
now doubts that their  departure is only a matter of time. While some
wish to soldier on, few see  any prospect that the United States will
leave behind an Iraq at peace  with itself, a united Iraq capable of
playing a constructive role in  regional affairs, or a strong Iraq
willing and able to balance Iran as it  once did. The United States
invaded Iraq against the counsel of our allies  and friends, drunk with
our own self-importance, convinced by our own  delusions, apparently
invincible in our ignorance, and utterly unprepared  for the
quasi-colonial mission we assumed. Contemporary Iraq is a monument  to
American martial prowess and civil ineptitude.

It now seems  likely our withdrawal will be undertaken for domestic
American political  reasons, again without much attention to Iraqi and
regional realities. But  withdrawal risks escalating the conflict inside
Iraq, infecting other  parts of the region with Iraq's sectarian strife,
and providing an early  graduation ceremony for terrorists bent on
applying elsewhere what they  have learned in Iraq. Unless diplomacy has
first crafted a regional  context that limits the damage, a
politically-dictated withdrawal will  crown our incompetence with
disgrace and devaluation as a security  partner. What kind of country is
it that invades another, trashes it, sets  it on fire, and then walks
away to let inhabitants and neighbors alike die  in the flames or perish
of smoke inhalation? Who will wish to associate  themselves with such a
country, still less entrust their security to  cooperation with it?

We did not consult the GCC countries or  others in the region about the
strategy or tactics of our invasion of  Iraq. We would do well to seek
their advice, counsel, and support - and  they would do well to insist
on our consulting them - as we make our next  moves, whether these are
within Iraq or away from it. Techniques of  asymmetric warfare pioneered
in Iraq now find their way within weeks to  Afghanistan and elsewhere.
The targeting of GCC rulers and oil and gas  facilities by terrorists
with connections to the mayhem in Iraq  underscores our common interest
in countering spillover from the jihadi  intervention in that country.
Similarly, the well-founded concern that  areas in the Gulf with mixed
Sunna and Sh`ia populations might suffer  contagion from the religious
struggles in Iraq emphasizes the imperative  of containing them.

These are closely connected and clearly  anticipatable problems that
affect many countries in the region. They must  not be left to be
addressed ad hoc and at the last minute.

Then,  there are the problems presented by Iranian ambitions, not just
for  nuclear weaponry but for preponderant influence in the Gulf. These
go well  beyond the issues of whether bombing Iran would not provoke it
to attempt  regime change in the countries from whose bases the attack
had been  launched, or simply confirm it and others in their judgment
that the only  effective protection against preemptive attack by the
United States is the  possession of a nuclear deterrent.

Assuming, as we must, in light  of the results similar US policies
toward north Korea have produced, that  Iran will eventually acquire a
nuclear deterrent, how do the GCC countries  plan to deal with Iran as a
nuclear power? Will each respond separately or  will the response be
collective? Will there be piecemeal appeasement or  defiant
reaffirmations of sovereign independence? If a nuclear umbrella or
 deterrent to the nuclear threat from Iran is deemed necessary, will
this  be collectively managed or will each country seek its own
protection? In  either context, what role, if any, do the Gulf Arabs
desire for the United  States or other nuclear powers? Is the role they
envisage for us one that  Americans can or will undertake?

Then, too, having destroyed  Iraq's utility in balancing Iran, we and
the GCC have yet to concert a  strategy for a new and sustainable
balance of power. Such a balance cannot  be sustained if, as was the
case in Saudi Arabia, the American military  presence becomes not an
asset to national security but its principal  liability, thanks to the
provocation it offers to political extremists.  How do we propose to
manage the contradiction between our desire to assure  the stability of
the Gulf and the fact that our presence in it is  inherently
destabilizing? If we are to avoid a strategic debacle, we  cannot leave
Iraq without agreeing on answers to these questions with our  Gulf Arab
partners.

Iran is emerging as yet another proof that  diplomacy-free foreign
policy does not work. Neither do lack of planning  or the refusal to
talk to interested allies and adversaries. It's not hard  to anticipate
the questions that will arise from the probable future  course of events
in Iran itself and in Iranian relationships with Iraq and  other
countries in the region. These too must not be left to tactical
 responses, improvised on the spot in the absence of strategy, sprung
with  no warning upon those whose cooperation or forbearance is
essential to  enable them to succeed.

Finally, let me allude briefly to the  issue of Israel, a country that
has yet to be accepted as part of the  Middle East and whose inability
to find peace with the Palestinians and  other Arabs is the driving
factor in the region's radicalization and  anti-Americanism.

The talented European settlers who formed the  state of Israel endowed
it with substantial intellectual and technological  superiority over any
other society in the Middle East. The dynamism of  Israel's immigrant
culture and the generous help of the Jewish Diaspora  rapidly gave
Israel a standard of living equivalent to that of European  countries.
For fifty years Israel has enjoyed military superiority in its  region.
Demonstrably, Israel excels at war; sadly, it has shown no talent  for
peace.

For almost forty years, Israel has had land beyond its  previously
established borders to trade for peace. It has been unable to  make this
exchange except when a deal was crafted for it by the United  States,
imposed on it by American pressure, and sustained at American  taxpayer
expense. For the past half decade Israel has enjoyed carte  blanche from
the United States to experiment with any policy it favored to  stabilize
its relations with the Palestinians and its other Arab  neighbors,
including most recently its efforts to bomb Lebanon into  peaceful
coexistence with it and to smother Palestinian democracy in its  cradle.

The suspension of the independent exercise of American  judgment about
what best serves our interests as well as those of Israelis  and Arabs
has caused the Arabs to lose confidence in the United States as  a peace
partner. To their credit, they have therefore stepped forward with
 their own plan for a comprehensive peace. By sad contrast, the American
 decision to let Israel call the shots in the Middle East has revealed
how  frightened Israelis now are of their Arab neighbors and how
reluctant this  fear has made them to risk respectful coexistence with
the other peoples  of their region. The results of the experiment are
in: left to its own  devices, the Israeli establishment will make
decisions that harm Israelis,  threaten all associated with them, and
enrage those who are not.

Tragically, despite all the advantages and opportunities Israel  has had
over the fifty-nine years of its existence, it has failed to  achieve
concord and reconciliation with anyone in its region, still less  to
gain their admiration or affection. Instead, with each decade, Israel's
 behavior has deviated farther from the humane ideals of its founders
and  the high ethical standards of the religion that most of its
inhabitants  profess. Israel and the Palestinians, in particular, are
caught up in an  endless cycle of reprisal and retaliation that
guarantees the perpetuation  of conflict in which levels of mutual
atrocities continue to escalate. As  a result, each generation of
Israelis and Palestinians has accumulated new  reasons to loathe the
behavior of the other, and each generation of Arabs  has detested Israel
with more passion than its predecessor. This is not  how peace is made.
Here, too, a break with the past and a change in course  are clearly in
order.

The framework proposed by Saudi Arabia's  King Abdullah at Beirut in
2002 offers Israel an opportunity to accomplish  both. It has the
support of all Arab governments. It would exchange Arab  acceptance of
Israel and a secure place for the Jewish state in the region  for
Israeli recognition of Palestinians as human beings with equal weight
 in the eyes of God, entitled to the same rights of democratic
 self-determination and domestic tranquility within secure borders that
 Israelis wish to enjoy. The proposal proceeds from self-interest. It
 recognizes how much the Arabs would gain from normal relations with
Israel  if the necessary conditions for mutual respect and
reconciliation could be  created.

Despite the fact that such a peace is so obviously also  in Israel's
vital and moral interests, history and the Israeli response to  date
both strongly suggest that without some tough love from Americans,
 including especially Israel's American coreligionists, Israel will not
 risk the uncertainties of peace. Instead, it will persist in the
belief,  despite all the evidence to the contrary, that it can gain
safety through  the officially sanctioned assassination of potential
opponents, the  terrorization of Arab civilians, and the cluster bombing
of neighbors  rather than negotiation with them. These policies have not
worked; they  will not work. But unless they are changed, the Arab peace
plan will  exceed its shelf life, and Arabs will revert to their
previous views that  Israel is an ethnomaniacal society with which it is
impossible for others  to coexist and that peace can be achieved only by
Israel's eventual  annihilation, much as the Crusader kingdoms that once
occupied Palestine  were eventually destroyed.

Americans need to be clear about the  consequences of continuing our
current counterproductive approaches to  security in the Middle East. We
have paid heavily and often in treasure in  the past for our unflinching
support and unstinting subsidies of Israel's  approach to managing its
relations with the Arabs. Five years ago we began  to pay with the blood
of our citizens here at home. We are now paying with  the lives of our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines on battlefields in  several
regions of the realm of Islam, with more said by our government's
 neoconservative mentors to be in prospect. Our policies in Afghanistan
and  Iraq are adding to the threats to our security and well-being, not
 reducing them. They have added and are adding to our difficulties and
 those of allies and partners, including Israel. They are not advancing
the  resolution of these problems or making anyone more secure. They
degrade  our moral standing and diminish our value as an ally. They
delight our  enemies and dismay our friends.

In the interest of all, it is  therefore time for a change of course.
But, as Seneca remarked almost  2,000 years ago, "if a man does not know
to what port he is steering, no  wind is favorable." It is past time
that we agreed on our destination and  devised a strategy for reaching
it. As events belatedly force us to come  up with a workable approach to
consequence management and lay a course to  take us beyond it, Americans
will need the advice of our partners in the  GCC and others in the region.

If we pay no attention to the  opinions and interests of these partners,
we should not be surprised to  discover that we have forfeited their
friendship and cooperation. Without  both, we cannot hope to manage and
overcome the consequences of the series  of policy disasters we have
contrived or to devise new and effective  policies. And we here, like
our friends in the region and elsewhere, will  all pay again for this
failure, and pay heavily. We must not allow that to  come to pass.


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