Here is the text of my September 25, 2006, speech with the two
introductions, one from a board member of the American Library in Paris,
the sponsor of the event. The other introduction is by French Ambassador
André Ross, former President of France-Amériques, with whom I made peace
in Laos in 1973 by establishing a Lao coalition government after 20
years of warfare. You may use the text of the speech as you deem useful.
JOHN GUNTHER DEAN, SPEECH ON LEBANON, SEPTEMBER 25, 2006, PARIS
At France-Amériques, Sponsored by the American Library in Paris
INTRODUCTION BY MICHELE GOMPEL, PAST PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF THE AMERICAN LIBRARY IN PARIS
I am Michèle Gompel, a longtime member, volunteer and trustee—and trustees are volunteers as well—and a past Chairman of the Board of Trustees, and there are many other trustees here to-night, and many members of the staff, and I hope that you’ve all had a chance to meet them, as they’ve been working very hard as ambassadors of the Library to all of you. It is a great honor on behalf of the Board of Trustees to welcome so many prestigious representatives of the interna-tional diplomatic community. We thank you, and we thank everybody for coming.
The American Library in Paris was founded at the end of the First World War with a collection of some 20,000 books that had been sent to our American forces during the War and were left over at the end of the War. There was also a $25,000 grant from the American Library Association. The mission was, and is, to serve as a cultural bridge between our two continents and as an example of modern American library science in Europe, with the accent on accessibility, which is what makes American library science unique. The Library is a private subscription library and receives no government subsidies, and we’re celebrating our 86th year of continuous operation. We thank Am-bassador Dean for his confidence in the Library and trusting us with this collection, which is a compilation, a collection, of over 1,400 items that are now available at the American Library. This collection will serve as an important span in the Library’s cultural bridge between the two conti-nents. We thank all of you who contributed financially to enable the Library to house this collec-tion and make possible this inaugural event tonight. I’d like to thank the Library staff for organizing this event tonight.
Ambassador Dean will be introduced to us by his fellow pillar in the foundation of modern diplo-matic history, Monsieur l’Ambassadeur de France, André Ross. For anyone who might not know, Ambassadeur de France is the highest title, dignitary title, that the French can confer upon their career diplomats. We’re very, very honored to have Ambassador Ross with us.
Fellow workers for peace in the world, between them they have been their countries’ top repre-sentatives in Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Zaire, India, Denmark, Japan, and Lebanon. Ambassador Dean will be speaking to us about Lebanon presently. Thank you for being with us, and thanks to France-Amériques, who has made us so welcome; and come and visit us at the Library.
INTRODUCTION BY AMBASSADOR ANDRÉ ROSS:
C’est un grand honneur pour France-Amériques de recevoir aujourd’hui l’American Library et les paroles que vous avez prononcées, Madame, nous y sommes profondément sensibles.
Je suis particulièrement honoré de dire quelques mots à notre ami de toujours, l’Ambassadeur Dean, que je connais depuis un certain nombre d’années. En effet, même si John Dean reste très jeune, et moi-même je crois pouvoir encore prononcer quelques mots, je dois dire que c’est par dizaines d’années que ce mesure la durée de notre amitié, et je pense, ou j’espère qu’il y aura encore quelques dizaines d’années pour poursuivre ces liens excellents entre nos deux ménages.
Comme il a été dit, John Dean a été un des plus brillants diplomates américains. Il a été à la fois un grand spécialiste de l’Asie, et un grand spécialiste du Moyen Orient. Grand spécialiste de l’Asie, il a eu à s’occuper du Sud-est asiatique, et c’est à ce moment-la que je l’ai connu à l’époque où nous étions ensemble au Laos. Puis, John Dean a exercé en Asie des fonctions d’une extrême importance au Cambodge, et ambassadeur en Thaïlande et ambassadeur en Inde, ou il a laissé un très grand souvenir. D’ailleurs, je vois ici notre ambassadeur en Inde, un ambassadeur français en Inde, qui était en même temps que John Dean à New Delhi. Et je dois dire que notre amitié a été une amitié en même temps une amitié américano-française, franco-américaine, car toute la carrière de John s’est déroulée sous le signe de l’amitié franco-américaine, et de cela il en est le symbole.
On a rappelé le rôle qu’il a joué à l’American Library pour que ses archives précieuses qui retracent toute sa carrière et qui ont été rédigées dans les moments les plus difficiles, que désormais ses archives seront à l’American Library et pourront être communiquées et, d’un autre côté, il y a actuellement des conversations entre l’American Library et le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères pour que cette collaboration puisse être de plus en plus étroite, et de cela nous sommes très reconnaissants, naturellement à John Dean, et aussi à l’American Library.
John, qui a été un grand spécialiste de l’Asie, a été aussi un grand spécialiste du Proche-Orient. Et comme ambassadeur au Liban, il a eu une influence extrêmement importante. Il a été un des meilleurs connaisseurs non seulement de ce que l’histoire connaît déjà, mais des dessous des cartes, et c’est cela qui est probablement la chose la plus essentielle dans notre carrière, c’est de connaître le dessous des cartes. Je vois ici un certain nombre d’amis qui ont connu également John au cours de sa carrière, et qui ont eu l’occasion de négocier avec lui ou de voir avec lui quelle pouvait être une position commune. Donc il y a ici un grand nombre d’amis francais de John.
J’ajouterai que France-Amériques est extrêmement fière que l’American Library ait choisi cette maison, siège de France-Amériques depuis 1917 et symbole de l’amitié franco-américaine. Ajouterai-je qu’il y a un autre symbole que je vois ici, c’est l’épouse française d’origine, de John, que a été une grande ambassadrice des Etats-Unis, appréciée de tous, et qui a été aussi extrêmement appréciée des communautés françaises.
John, je crois qu’il est important que je ne parle pas trop longtemps, car vous avez beaucoup de choses à nous dire. Alors je vais vous céder la parole.
SPEECH BY JOHN GUNTHER DEAN, SEPTEMBER 25, 2006, PARIS
Sponsored by the American Library in Paris in cooperation with France-Amériques
Thanks for these very nice words. These are a few notes I have; I am not going to read them. I’d just like to say whatever I’m going to say tonight are not my personal views. They are largely based on documents, which I gave to the U.S. National Archives in 2003, in 2004, and in 2005—11 linear feet of documents. My life story was put by the National Archives on Internet, where you can read it as “The Oral History of John Gunther Dean.” But the documents at the National Archives are in part still not declassified. And the reason I am speaking is not for the enhancement of my reputation. All of us come and go, but institutions rest. And the idea is basically that perhaps the American Library in Paris, working with French authorities, can establish some kind of a current diplomatic history section, where we can learn from each other and future generations will learn from mistakes we all make.
So that is the purpose of our meeting today: launching an institution.
You may ask, why did you have all these papers, 11 linear feet? Three meters of documents?
Well, I’ll tell you how this came about. I was stationed at the American Embassy in Paris, as First Secretary, a rank of no importance whatsoever, except I was the guy who knew something about the Far East and Southeast Asia: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia. I had served there before. And, on the 27th of January, 1967, Robert Kennedy came to Paris. At the time he was running basically to be the Democratic contender for the 1968 Presidential election. Before Kennedy arrived, Ambassador Chip Bohlen had told me, “John, you are control officer for Robert Kennedy.”
Robert Kennedy, who had been Attorney General under his brother, was then Senator. He had a flexible position on many issues. I took him to see André Malraux. Ambassador Bohlen took him to see President DeGaulle. Suddenly we got a call from the office of the Director for Asia of the Quai d’Orsay, Monsieur Manac’h. Mr. Malo, who is here tonight, was at the time deputy to Mr. Manac’h. Malo later became twice Ambassador of France to China, and French Ambassador to the united Vietnam. Kennedy and I were called over to the French Foreign Office, and that was the 29th of January.
What happened? We were four people in the room, and the French had received “the peace signal” from Hanoi. It was, “If you (the Americans) stop the bombing of North Vietnam, the United States can have direct talks with the North Vietnamese.” Well, I was the note-taker, and I took notes furiously. I went back to see Mr. Manac’h in the afternoon to show him the cable I planned to send on the meeting and asked him, “Is this ok?” He replied, “Yes, this is it.”
I sent the message to Washington “Top Secret,” and the next day, on January 30, 1967, my wife and I went to Egypt. Kennedy returned to Washington the same day. About the 7th or 8th of Febru-ary, at the hotel in Upper Egypt, I got word: “Sir, there is a telephone call for you from the United States.”
It was a State Department colleague in Washington, who told me, “Hey, John, your name is on the front page of the newspapers. The President of the United States, Johnson, is quoted, ‘Who is that son of a bitch John Gunther Dean? (I am quoting, I am sorry) Fire him!’” The top secret cable had been leaked to the press. Well, I was scared stiff. Fortunately, Ambassador Chip Bohlen was in Washington, and he said, “It couldn’t have been John Dean who leaked that message,” and he found that it was an Assistant Secretary close to President Johnson who had leaked the message in order to create a confrontation between Johnson and Robert Kennedy.
But I learned one lesson so many years ago. The lowest man on the totem pole gets always blamed when something goes wrong. So you’ve got to do something to protect yourself. And from that day on, in1967, I kept every cable I ever wrote. And when I became Ambassador, I also kept the messages of my team, which were important, as well as the answers from Washington.
And when I left the Foreign Service in 1989, I asked the government to ship my papers to a neutral place. One of the ambassadors is here tonight where the papers were shipped to. They stayed in a bank vault for many years, until a President of the United States wrote me, “We would like to have these documents.” So I went to the National Archives on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washing-ton, and since it was a President who asked for these documents, I started giving the Presidential Library of the National Archives all the papers. And what I’m going to be saying, ladies and gen-tlemen, are not my personal views. They are based on actual historic documents, and what I hope to accomplish with this speech tonight is not talk about myself. I’m an old man—but maybe start with the help of the French, of the American Library in Paris, an organization where we all can learn from each other, by having a diplomatic history section at the American Library in Paris. We don’t have to agree on everything, but we have to be able to talk to each other and learn from each other. And that is why I gave these documents to the National Archives, and what I’ll be saying is all documented.
And I’m happy to tell you that many of the papers I donated to the National Archives have already been released to the public. I spoke in June in Washington, in close cooperation with the State Department, on Cambodia. I can tell you the facts are quite different from what some people think they are as reported by the newspapers. I was told very recently by Washington that the papers on Lebanon are going to be released very soon, probably end of October or November. That means people can consult these papers. That is important. Newspapers can write their version, but it’s not always exactly the whole story.
This is why I gave all these papers—so that, at the end, truth prevails.
Recognizing some of the personalities here tonight with whom I worked in diplomacy:
André Ross is an old friend. Yes, I am very honored that so many ambassadors are present here tonight. From birth I speak German. I spoke French when I went to the university in France. I mar-ried the most wonderful French lady. I’ve been married for 54 years and am very happy, which probably accounts for my being a Francophile. English I first learned from my English governess and later used it in the U.S.
And I’d just like to greet some of the people here. There’s Ambassador Hunt, who’s sitting over there. We worked together in Vietnam 53 years ago, at the time of Dien Bien Phu. Yes, the French and Americans were working together, and we’ve been friends, and we’re still working together. He became a great ambassador of France to many, many countries.
In the peace talks on Vietnam in Paris, I worked with Mr. Manac’h and M. Malo, who is also here tonight. At the time he was the deputy to Mr. Manac’h, the Director of Asia in the French Foreign Office. We played the major role in bringing the peace talks on Vietnam to France. It was coop-eration between the United States and France in convincing people there is a way of talking to-gether, and even talking to adversaries.
There are two people here tonight who know me from my second service in Vietnam: my friend the German Ambassador Mr. Neubert, who is the German Ambassador to France today. When I was deputy in M1-Corps, Central Vietnam, at a time when we had five U.S. divisions in our corps and I was a deputy to the corps commander, Mr Neubert was doing humanitarian service on the German hospital ship the Helgoland, helping the wounded, and he’s here tonight.
There’s another person here tonight who reminds me of my service in Vietnam: Mr. Ducrest. In 1997, going through the archives of France and the archives of the United States, he found that President Nixon of the United States had asked the commander-in-chief of the U.S. military in Vietnam to protect the Cham museum in Da Nang, which is today the number one tourist attrac-tion in that country. Last year (October 2005) when there was the big Cham exhibit in Paris at the Musée Guimet, the Vietmamese Minister of Culture came up and thanked me for having protected the museum. There was not a single piece of sculpture missing from that famous museum. It was a result of French-American cooperation, because the request for protection of the museum had been made by the French curator in Paris, who had asked the President of the United States to intervene and protect the Cham Museum.
In Laos, yes, I worked with André Ross, and I’m going to tell you for a diplomat the greatest pleasure in life is to make peace. After 20 years of warfare in Laos, Ambassador Ross, with the help of other countries, we made peace by helping in the establishment of a Lao coalition govern-ment. The United States never broke relations with Laos, in spite of the fact we broke relations in Cambodia and in Vietnam after the U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia in 1975.
In Cambodia, I worked with Mr. Dyriac, he’s very ill, and he lives in southern France; he couldn’t come. But I will tell you, he gave us the report which he gave to the President of France, because I left Cambodia on the 12th of April 1975, and he left on the 30th, and he saved American lives, and some of the people had to be disguised as Frenchmen in order to survive and get out. His papers were given to the American Library here in France. It’s a sign of trying to find ways of working together.
In Lebanon, my colleague Mr. Delamarre was unfortunately assassinated. As you will see, I es-caped that fate.
And yes, when I worked in India, I worked with my French friend, Ambassador André Lewin, who is here tonight, and I think the story he and I will say one day, I don’t know when, on India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, is one of the great stories of our times.
My tenure as U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon (1978-1981)
I’d like now to turn to Lebanon. And what I’m going to say is very simple. I had orders from two Presidents, a Republican and a Democrat. First a Democrat, then a Republican. I was re-appointed there. And the policy I was given was very simple. It was to defend the territorial integrity and in-dependence of Lebanon and support the central government of Lebanon. How did I do this? I’ll tell you: I took the official American limousine. I put the President’s flag on one side and the American flag on the other side, and no militia, whether it be of this denomination or that denomination, could stop me from where I was going. I went to Akkar in the north to visit American projects, I went to the Israeli border in the south—some people objected to all this—but by my actions I was defending the territorial integrity of Lebanon and the central government of Lebanon.
I worked closely with the President of Lebanon, Elias Sarkis, a Maronite and I’ve been back many times to Lebanon. A few years ago, I visited his grave in Lebanon. I worked with Prime Minister Hoss, a Sunni. I also worked with the head of the Assembly—yes, a Shia, Nabil Berri, I worked with him closely in Lebanon. I worked with every denomination represented in the central gov-ernment. I also worked with former Lebanese President, Mr. Frangiah, who didn’t like Americans. My job was to work with the central government, whether the person was Christian, Moslem, I couldn’t care less. Those were my orders, I was supposed to support the central government and Lebanon’s territorial integrity, and anybody who came against this, I spoke up publicly to de-nounce it.
I did have two problems, and I will tell you, because if you read today’s newspaper, things repeat themselves. I had problems with certain Lebanese militias. The Phalange were fighting the Chamounists, both Christian. The Israelis were sending a helicopter every two weeks for Beshir Gemayel, the leader of the Phalange, to go down to Israel. They gave him money and they gave him arms. In 1979, a Maronite monk came to me and said, “Ambassador Dean, can you talk to Beshir, we are all Lebanese. He can work with you, but he has to remember, we are a multi-religious society. Talk to him.” I went up high in the mountains to a monastery, and I talked to Beshir, and I found a way, with Beshir, who had a certain nationalistic appeal. I said, “Beshir, work with us. You can work with the United States. We can also provide what you need, but you must work with us in support of the Lebanese central government and for the unity of all of Leba-non.” And he did.
As a matter of fact, my wife is here, and she can tell you just before Beshir Gemayel was supposed to be inaugurated as President of Lebanon, but he wasn’t because he was assassinated, as everybody knows, he called me, and he said, “John, please come. I want you to attend my inauguration with your wife.” But it wasn’t to be.
But while I succeeded with Beshir Gemayel, I was not able to do much with a rebellious Lebanese major by the name of Saad Haddad. He had established, in southern Lebanon, a radio station, a television station, and all around it were barbed wire and mines. And who was doing all the pro-gramming? They were American religious fundamentalists, who were preaching the message of Zionism. These Americans were in Lebanon without a visa and without authorization from the central government to broadcast. Saad Haddad was in open rebellion against the central govern-ment. I tried to do something about it. I talked to people in Washington. President Sarkis tried very hard, but I’m mentioning it, to no avail. Quite the contrary, Mr. Saad Haddad was asked by the mayor of New York to come to New York, and there he was received as a hero. He was a traitor in Lebanon, and we tried to stop his activities. It didn’t work.
I will mention two other activities I was involved in, before I turn to the problems of Lebanon to-day. I was very involved with UNIFIL from 1978 to 1981, because UNIFIL had the problem then as now of being reporters and observers and not really preventing infiltrations. With my French colleagues, we decided we would have the first commander of UNIFIL removed in order to get somebody more energetic to replace him. Today the world leaders have the same problem. UNIFIL needs a clear mandate. What they should do, and their job is very clearly to support the central government of Lebanon, and to prevent using Southern Lebanon as a platform for launching attacks on Israel or as a target of Israeli attacks on Palestinians.
I also started a military aid program to the army of Lebanon in 1979. The American government started giving military aid to the Lebanese army. Everything I ever did I discussed with the French ambassador beforehand, and when General Khoury, the head of the Lebanese army, came to me, “We want 155 howitzers.” I would receive a cable from our southern neighbor, in Israel, “You can’t give 155 howitzers, because that’s dangerous for us.” But I was giving them to the central government of Lebanon. So I gave 105 howitzers instead. And when the Lebanese army came to me and said, “I want tanks,” I was able to give armored personnel carriers. It’s not the same, ladies and gentlemen.
I’m saying these things to show you the very close relationship I had with the Lebanese on in-structions of two American Presidents. The governor of the central bank of Lebanon, Michel Khoury, gave me, the American Ambassador, the counter signature over billions of dollars held by the Reserve Bank of Lebanon in Switzerland. The Lebanese had this trust in the American Ambas-sador because we supported a united Lebanon, the central government of Lebanon, and I called a spade a spade, as you will see. I’d like to say I do believe that there is still a great deal of good will in Lebanon for the United States among most segments of Lebanese society, but we have to be evenhanded, fair, and just.
I think, for example, the American University of Beirut is a good example of what we can do for each other, but I hope that everybody will listen. Even today, policymakers in various capitals, including my own country, can build on this excellent evenhandedness, which was carried out by previous American administrations.
U.S. – Palestinian links
I had a relationship in Lebanon with the Palestinians. I was authorized to see what I could do to protect the American security, not only of the Embassy, but also for Americans in the area. And I went to everybody who could help, including the Palestinians. Yes, ladies and gentlemen, my predecessor-once-removed, the American Ambassador, Frank Melloy, was assassinated, and it was Arafat who brought his body back…. he was not involved, but he was able to find a way of getting the body of my predecessor back to the American Embassy. And then when I traveled around Lebanon I always would tell everybody who could help me, “Protect me.”
In late 1979, I got a message from Washington, “Go and approach the Palestinians and ask them to help us get some of the American hostages out from Teheran.”
And, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Arafat, Abu Walid, and Abu Jihad, these Palestinian leaders, went to Teheran, and on behalf of the United States were working with the Iranians to get the first American hostages out. Since the Ambassador of Switzerland is here tonight, I am pleased to mention that it was the International Red Cross, when the first thirteen were released, thanks to the Palestinians, who flew the hostages out of Teheran. While passing messages to and from Wash-ington via the Palestinians, the Iranians also told the Palestinians, “By the way, we would also like to talk about the $8.5 billion belonging to Iran, which the United States government blocked in the U.S.” I passed the message on, and since not everybody knows diplomatic history from A to Z, I will mention that when the Shah was still in power, he asked the French government to help build a nuclear power station, and he had advanced the funds for that project. And when the Shah fell from power, this project was abandoned, but after some years, the French government paid back the money which had been advanced by Iran. The $8.5 billion which were frozen in the United States in 1979 are $20 billion today, and the message I get is very simple. “Let’s talk about it.” That’s all. Let me just say that the number one hostage in Teheran was until this year, 2006, the President of the American Academy of Diplomacy. His name is Bruce Laingen. He was Chargé d’Affaires in Lebanon in 1979. And I showed him the actual cable where Arafat went to bat for him personally. And he has written this year, 2006, as President of the American Academy of Di-plomacy, an article published in a State Department magazine, entitled “Let Us Sit Down and Talk to the Iranians.”
I would like to mention one other point on the Palestinian – Lebanon relationship. It happened only about two months ago. And that is the effort underway for the beatification of Cardinal Cooke of New York. I knew Cardinal Cooke from before, and I asked the Cardinal of New York whether he would come to Lebanon as my guest, a secular ambassador of the United States. Not only did he come, but he made his first visit to the Sunni Mufti, the second visit to Chamcedin, the head of the Shia community, then afterwards he called on all the various Christian denominations. Cardinal Cooke was dying of cancer when he came to Lebanon. And when he went back to America, he talked to the President of the United States, and he said, “Help this guy Dean. Help him. Give him some money for every one of the 18 denominations in Lebanon. Give him nine million dollars so he can build a humanitarian project for every one of the 18 religions, for example, an old-age home, an orphanage, something for the nurses, etc.” And we did carry out projects for all 18 denominations. And when I was asked two months ago to support the beatification, I considered it a great, great honor. Cardinal Cooke died shortly after my departure from Lebanon, but he had put forward in Lebanon the best foot of America, which is tolerance and support for Lebanon as one nation with all the various different religions living together.
But what these two American presidents—Carter and Reagan—did, which was of major impor-tance was that they established the Palestinians as valid interlocutors for the United States in try-ing to find a solution to the problems of the Near East.
Relations with Israel
I will speak very briefly about my relationship with Israel. And I would like you to know some-thing—I think you all know it anyway. I was born in Germany, and had to leave. And I came as a little boy to the United States, and I am a good example why the United States is a fabulous coun-try, I had a rewarding career in trying to serve the nation. And I honestly believe that I’d like to help the Israelis so that they can continue to be a nation, with security. But when I was in Leba-non, to be very frank, the Israelis and maybe they’re still doing it today, I leave it up to your own judgment, they were always dividing Christians from Moslems, and the Sunni from the Shia, and the Jews, well-known people like Edmond Safra, di Piccioto, who were well-known financiers in the world, who were working very closely with the Moslems and the Christians from the Middle East, they worked together very closely. There is a difference between being pro-Israeli or being of the Jewish religion.
When I came to Lebanon in 1978, Mr. Arafat’s assistant, Abu Hassan, is there anybody who re-members that name? Abu Hassan was assassinated. Unfortunately, three people had come from Israel to do the job. What the people didn’t know was that this man, Abu Hassan, had a close rela-tionship with the United States.
I was attacked personally by Mr. Begin for being not an Ambassador, I was an “intelligence agent.” I was slandered in the Knesset, and the President of the United States instructed the American ambassador in Tel Aviv to ask Mr. Begin to go back into the Knesset and apologize. “Ambassador Dean is carrying out the orders of the American government.”
Well, it didn’t do much good, because three or four weeks later, our cars were attacked as we were going on our way from the residence to the president of the American University of Beirut. We were a three-car caravan. My wife was with me in the ambassador’s limousine. My son-in-law and my daughter, who are present here, were all in this assassination attempt against the American ambassador. I called Washington. My car was able to get away. The car in which my daughter and her fiancé were in couldn’t get away because it was completely shot out. Twenty-one bullets were fired against us and two light anti-tank weapons. And these weapons, every weapon in the world has a number. And the Lebanese gave me the number of these weapons, ladies and gentlemen; these weapons (light anti-tank weapons) had been shipped from the United States to Israel under the MDAP program.
And I think the Lebanese newspaper An Nahar is represented here tonight. Mr. Tueni, who is here, is the nephew of the owner and publisher of this great newspaper of Lebanon. An Nahar had the courage to write that the weapons used against the American Ambassador to Lebanon were shipped from Israel.
In today’s world, I think, to be very frank, that the Israeli lobby in Washington—AIPAC—is still a major factor in American foreign policy. Please be realistic. Their influence is largely through Congress, and Congress can add all kinds of amendments to all kinds of legislation. The Israeli lobby is also supported very much by some of the religious fundamentalists in our country. And if you’re interested in the American position today, I would just like to say that the report written by Mr. Walt from the Kennedy School at Harvard University and Mr. Mearsheimer from the University of Chicago is making more and more noise. The article is entitled “The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy.” It is available through Internet, either through the Harvard University or through the London Review of Books. Up to you to decide the merits of this article, but I do believe that reading it helps everybody to understand the problem existing today in the formulation of foreign policy in Washington.
Before closing, I would like to draw some overall conclusions from the July war against Lebanon. In this way, I bring the Lebanon situation up to date. These are my personal views and do not nec-essarily reflect anybody else’s conclusion:
1. The way the July 2006 war ended shows that we no longer live today in a unipolar world. Today, the world community has several power centers.
2. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 on Lebanon is being carried out militarily and po-litically by Europeans and Moslem countries. The Europeans enter the Near East as peacemakers. For all practical purposes, the U.S. and NATO are not involved in any sig-nificant way.
3. Europeans and Arabs talk about the need to link stability in southern Lebanon to finding a way of moving toward a peaceful solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict.
4. The plan for making progress on the Palestine question most often cited publicly by Euro-pean and Arab leaders is a return to the peace initiative adopted at the Arab League Summit in Beirut in 2002,which had originally been proposed by the then Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. This offer was ratified by all 22 members of the Arab League, including the Palestinian delegation. It offered recognition of Israel in the 1967 borders.
5. More and more Moslem and European leaders link progress in fighting international ter-rorism to making progress in dealing with the problems of Lebanon, Palestine, and Israel. Let us hope that all players on the international scene will also listen to this approach.