WORLD ORDER AFTER THE LEBANON WAR
WORLD ORDER AFTER THE LEBANON WAR
*All in all, the Lebanon War is likely to be remembered not for the
birth pains of ‘a new Middle East’ (Condoleezza Rice), but as the death
throes of a system of world order that accepted war as the inevitable
basis of stability and change in relations among sovereign states.*
*WORLD ORDER AFTER THE LEBANON WAR*
**
*Richard Falk* (VIII/24/2006) Prof @ Princeton University
**
*There has been much commentary on the significance of the Lebanon War.
There is an unresolved debate about whether there was a victorious side
in the war, and even what the idea of victory means. There are various
suggestions about how to prevent a new war between Israel and Hezbollah,
whether by relying mainly on the UN stabilization force or by reviving
diplomacy between Israel and its various adversaries. Is it time to talk
with Hezbollah and Hamas? What does the inconclusiveness of the war tell
us about the benefits and limitations of military superiority in such a
conflict? Could Israel have used its military capabilities more
effectively, or were deeper structural restraints operative? These are
all important issues, deserving of reflection and dialogue, and
hopefully encourage a turn away from violence by all sides in their
search for peace and security.*
**
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*All in all, the Lebanon War is likely to be remembered not for the
birth pains of ‘a new Middle East’ (Condoleezza Rice), but as the death
throes of a system of world order that accepted war as the inevitable
basis of stability and change in relations among sovereign states.*
*WORLD ORDER AFTER THE LEBANON WAR*
**
*Richard Falk* (VIII/24/2006) Prof @ Princeton University
**
*There has been much commentary on the significance of the Lebanon War.
There is an unresolved debate about whether there was a victorious side
in the war, and even what the idea of victory means. There are various
suggestions about how to prevent a new war between Israel and Hezbollah,
whether by relying mainly on the UN stabilization force or by reviving
diplomacy between Israel and its various adversaries. Is it time to talk
with Hezbollah and Hamas? What does the inconclusiveness of the war tell
us about the benefits and limitations of military superiority in such a
conflict? Could Israel have used its military capabilities more
effectively, or were deeper structural restraints operative? These are
all important issues, deserving of reflection and dialogue, and
hopefully encourage a turn away from violence by all sides in their
search for peace and security.*
**
( Collapse )