Subject:
Iraqi Shi'a politics
From:
<rayclose@aol.com>
Date:
Tue, 12 Aug 2003 16:20:49 EDT
This was sent to me by an English friend. He draws extensively from a recent article carried in Beirut's Daily Star, written by my friend Juan Cole, of the Univ. of Michigan, who has emerged as the primary specialist in Shi'a affairs among American Middle East scholars.
Maintaining a Dialogue with the Shi'a
Nearly four months after the fall of Baghdad, the occupation has still not
been widened into a genuine peacekeeping and nation-building exercise - and
a notable gap is a constructive dialogue with the Shi'a which will be
essential if the objective of a broad-based provisional government is to be
achieved. But there are hopeful signs and one of the more important is the
patience of the majority Shia Muslims in maintaining a dialogue with the
CPA and its membership of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). When the IGC
was installed last month Its 25 members, representative of the country, had
no less than 13 Shia representatives - together with five Arab Sunni
Muslims, five Kurds (also Sunni), one Christian and one Turkoman. Some
analysts suggest that the quiescence of the Shi'a reflects an anticipation
that relying on their weight of numbers (60% of the population) they intend
to play a preponderant role within the IGC in appointing ministers,
approving the budget and reorganising the judiciary. The IGC is also
supposed to draw up the constitution. An elected constituent assembly,
drawing members proportionally from Iraq's 18 provinces, would ipso facto
have a Shi'a majority which would give them a stake in the success of the
transition and some safeguard that it will not be manipulated by outside
interests.
In an article for the Daily Star published on 8 August 2003, Professor Juan
Cole, professor of modern Middle Eastern and South Asian history at the
University of Michigan, reported that most Shiite leaders in Iraq have made
a tactical decision not to resist the Anglo-American occupation during the
coming year. They hope the US, in recreating Iraq as a parliamentary
democracy, will give them the political power they deserve by virtue of
their numbers. If not, or if the Americans overstay their welcome, the
Shiites might well turn against them. It is not, however, clear that the
community is united enough yet effectively to close ranks against coalition
forces.
Prof Cole goes on to report that as a result of their differences over the
shape of a future Iraq, Shiite clerics have fallen to fighting an
underground guerrilla war against one another. The chief prizes are the
populous neighborhoods of eastern Baghdad and the revered shrine cities of
Najaf and Karbala. Najaf contains the tomb of Ali, the Prophet's cousin and
son-in-law, who was assassinated in 661. Karbala is the site of the shrine
of Imam Hussein, Ali's martyred son, who was cut down when he sparked a
rebellion in 681. Shiite Islam revolves around the commemoration of these
two martyrdoms, with annual readings, processions and rituals of
self-flagellation.The forces of young firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr
appear to havesucceeded in dominating the east Baghdad neighborhoods. In
Najaf, Sadristshave clashed with followers of the Supreme Council for the
IslamicRevolution in Iraq (SCIRI) over control of the shrine of Imam Ali.
Theyare also attempting to force the quietist Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani
andhis clerical allies out of the city.
In Karbala, Sadrists and followers of Sistani have also struggled for
control of the mosque of Imam Hussein, one of the premier pulpits in the
Shiite world. Last June they had reached an agreement to alternate
preachers, but Sadr abrogated it in July. On July 26, Sadrists held a rally
in Karbala against US Marines patrolling too close to the Imam Hussein
shrine. Someone in the crowd fired at the US troops, who returned fire,
reportedly killing a man. They also struck the shrine with tear gas
canisters. This provoked another demonstration the following Sunday, which
turned ugly when Marines wounded nine demonstrators. It seems likely that
hard-line Sadrists deliberately drew the Marines into firing on a civilian
crowd in front of the emotionally charged shrine.
Last Friday, Sadr called for the Marines to be tried by Islamic law courts
for their "attack on the shrine of Imam Hussein." He called on all Shiites
who were cooperating with the American civil administration, including
Kurds and SCIRI members, to repent and instead join his proposed militia,
the Army of the Mahdi. His congregation repeatedly shouted: "No, no to
America No, no to the occupier No, no to tyranny."
The divisions among the major religious currents in Iraqi Shiism and the
differences between Iraq's religious, secular and tribal groups have proved
a boon to US administrators in Iraq, giving them breathing room. A united
Shiite community could likely force the Americans out of the country by
holding huge, urban demonstrations, as happened in Iran in 1978 as a
prelude to the Iranian revolution.
There is clearly a widespread sentiment that the Americans should depart
within a year. If they commit any further mistakes like shooting civilians
in front of the Imam Hussein shrine, they could easily incite more hatred
against themselves and shorten their timetable. At that point many Shiites
might turn away from the staid Sistani and follow Sadr, not only in the
slums where he is already popular, but also in Basra and other Shiite
cities in the south."
An interesting feature of any Shi'a political revue is the apparent
quietism and lack of public political initiatives from Tehran. In view of
the evident ability of Iran greatly to complicate the CPA task by stirring
up the Shi'a community of Iraq, there must be good reasons for this. Could
there be behind the scene discussions between Tehran and Washington on such
subjects as the future of the MKO units captured by coalition forces in
Northern Iraq, or the Al-Qa'ida leaders said to be held by Tehran? The dog
has not barked in the night, Washington has not spoken of WMD being
developed by Tehran, and that in itself is significant. The SCIRI
leadership, beholden to Iran for political and material support, retains
its membership of the Iraqi Governing Council and shows every sign of
continuing to do so.
Geoffrey
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